Suppose you want to distribute tasks among the members of a team. Members have preferences over tasks and these preferences may be conflicting (e.g. two members may want to do the same task). How should we distribute the tasks through a lottery such that no member is envious of another one?
Suppose you want to distribute tasks among the members of a team. Members have preferences over tasks and these preferences may be conflicting (e.g. two members may want to do the same task). How should we distribute the tasks through a lottery such that no member is envious of another one?
Our solution guarantees the following properties:
Probabilistic serial rule (PS) provides a probabilistic fair solution, similar to RP. However it achieves stronger efficiency and fairness guarantees (see here for a detailed comparison). It works as follows: suppose items are different types of pizzas. Each agent starts "eating" her top choice pizza at the same rate as every other agent. Once a pizza is consumed, agents move to their next preferred pizza; until all pizzas are eaten.
PS guarantees that the probabilistic matching (lottery) is efficient and envy-free. We illustrate the probabilistic matching (lottery) assigned to each participant. To ensure that the sampled assignment is fair ex post (EF1), a combination of PS and Birkhoff's decomposition algorithm is used.
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